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Abstract:This study aims to examine and analyze the effect of good corporate governance 
indicators consisting of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the audit committee, the 
independence of the commissioners and the independence of the board of directors is partially 
affected or simultaneously to the financial performance of the companies listed in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange and also to test and analyze whether the ability of capital structure may moderate the 
relationship between good corporate governance variables with an indicator that consists of 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the audit committee, the independence of the 
commissioners and the independence of the board of directors at companies listed Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. The population in this study are all manufacturing companies in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Of the 143 companies as population samples taken as many as 20 companies were 
determined by purposive sampling method. The analytical method used is multiple linear regression 
analysis and residual test. Results of testing the first hypothesis is partially shows that institutional 
ownership and managerial ownership have a significant effect on financial performance, while 
simultaneously showing that variable institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the audit 
committee, the independence of the commissioners and the independence of the board of directors 
affect the financial performance. The second hypothesis testing showed that the capital structure is 
not able to moderate the relationship variables institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the 
audit committee, the independence of the commissioners and the independence of the board of 
directors of the financial performance of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In determining investment decisions within a company, it is important for potential investors to 
know the conditions of financial performance tersebut.Media that can be used to view the financial 
performance of the company is a financial report by performing financial statement analysis that aims 
to provide information regarding the financial position and changes in the financial position of a 
company which is useful for a number of users of financial statements in decision making. 
According to Arifin (2005), in his article submitted to the Senate Session of the University of 
Diponegoro University in 2005, it was stated that Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is a very useful 
for the users of financial statements in decision making because of the principles of transparency and 
accountability, and presentation of accounting information qualified and complete. 
Furthermore Arifin (2005) states that GCG is a very useful for users of financial reporting in 
decision-making because of the principles of transparency and accountability, as well as presentation 
of quality accounting information and complete. 
Research The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance (IICG), 2002, found that the main 
reason for companies implementing GCG is regulatory compliance. The Company believes that the 
implementation of GCG is another form of business ethics and business ethics that has long been the 
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company's commitment, and the implementation of GCG related to the improvement of corporate 
image. Companies that practice GCG will experience improved image, and increased corporate value. 
This is supported by a survey conducted by the Asian Corporate Governance Association 
(ACGA) that 11 countries in Asia to be comparable and said to follow international standards must 
get an 80% value. It can be seen that Singaporeans with 69% value still need a long way to reach 
80%. Moreover, Indonesia only reached half of the target of 37% (Asian Corporate Association, 
2012). 
One of the problems that exist in corporate governance is about planning, coordination, 
mandating and how to take the company's economic policy by the stakeholders in the company. Each 
company has its own mission vision. Of course with the vision of the mission, the company has a 
direction and purpose. But to achieve this, strong cooperation among stakeholders is required and 
certainly with good corporate governance. 
Stakeholders in the company include institutional ownership, managerial ownership, audit 
committee, independent board of commissioners, independent board of directors, and others. All of 
these factors are suspected to have an effect on the determination of capital resources. 
 
II. LITERATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Financial performance 
 According to Horn (1998) Financial performance is a measure of corporate achievement then 
profit is one of the tools used by managers. Financial performance will also provide an efficiency 
picture of the use of funds on the results will benefit can be seen after comparing net income after tax. 
2.2. Good Corporate Governance (GCG) 
 The Organization for Economic Development and Development (1999) defines corporate 
governance as a structure by which shareholders, commissioners and managers develop corporate 
objectives and means to achieve those goals and oversee performance. GCG is essentially about a 
system, process, and set of rules governing relationships between various stakeholders especially in 
the narrow sense of the relationship between shareholders, board of commissioners, and boards of 
directors for the achievement of organizational goals. GCG is intended to regulate these relationships 
and prevent significant mistakes in corporate strategy and to ensure that errors can be corrected 
immediately. 
2.2.1. Institutional Ownership 
 Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares of companies owned by institutions or 
institutions such as insurance companies, banks, investment companies and other institutional 
ownership (Tarjo, 2008). Institutional ownership may be referred to as institutional investors, often 
called sophisticated investors. 
2.2.2. Managerial ownership 
 According to Wahidahwati (2001) Managerial ownership is a shareholder of management who 
actively participate in corporate decision making. Managerial ownership implies a manager's dual 
role, that is, managers act as shareholders. As a manager as well as shareholders do not want the 
company in a state of financial difficulties even went bankrupt. 
2.2.3. Audit Committee 
 The Indonesian Audit Committee (IKAI) association defines the audit committee as a 
professional and independent working committee established by the board of commissioners and, 
therefore, its duty is to assist and strengthen the functioning of the board of commissioners (or 
supervisory board) in carrying out the oversight function of the financial reporting process , risk 
management, audit implementation and implementation of corporate governance in companies. 
2.2.4. Independence of the Board of Commissioners 
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 Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that independent commissioners may act as mediators in disputes 
between internal managers and oversee management policies and advise management. Independent 
commissioner is the best position to carry out monitoring function in order to create GCG company. 
2.2.5. Independence of the Board of Directors 
 According to Yusrizal (2011) the board of directors is the organ of the company authorized and 
fully responsible for the management of the company for the benefit of the company, in accordance 
with the intent and purpose of the company and representing the company, both inside and outside the 
court in accordance with the provisions of the articles of association. The independent director shall 
replace the term of Non-Affiliated Director based on the Decision Letter of the Board of Directors of 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange Number Kep-00001 / BE / 01-2014 regarding the amendment to Rule 
Number I-A concerning the listing of shares and Securities that are equity in addition to shares issued 
by listed companies. 
2.3. Capital Structure 
 According to Weston and Brigham (2005), the targeted capital structure is the mix or mix of 
debt, preferred stock, ordinary shares the firm wants in its capital structure. The optimal capital 
structure is a combination of equity that maximizes the company's stock price. 
 
III. CONCEPT AND HYPOTHESES FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
Based on the above concept framework, the hypothesis in this study are as follows: 
H1: Implementation of good corporate governance consisting of institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, audit committee, board of commissioner independence, and independence of the 
board of directors influence the financial performance. 
H2: Capital structure moderates good corporate governance relationship consisting of institutional 
ownership, managerial ownership, audit committee, board of commissioner independence, and 
board independence on financial performance at manufacturing companies listed on BEI. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
This research is a causal research (Causal research). The research population of 143 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012 -2015. Companies 
sampled in this study were selected based on certain criteria (purposive sampling) .Therefore, 
the sample in the study were as many as 20 (twenty) manufacturing companies listed on the 
Good Corporate Governance (GCG) 
 
Institutional Ownership 
 (X1) 
Financial 
performance 
(Y) 
Managerial ownership 
(X2) 
Audit Committee 
 (X3) 
Independence of the 
Board of Commissioners 
(X4) 
Capital Structure 
 (Z) 
Independence of the 
Board of Directors 
 (X5) 
4 
 
Indonesia Stock Exchange which has data on institutional ownership, managerial ownership, 
the audit committee, the independence of the board of commissioners, and the independence 
of the board of directors. This study uses secondary data types sourced from Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Secondary data collection method using documentation method. Data analysis 
methods used include descriptive statistics, classical assumption test, multiple linear 
regression model and multiple linear regression model moderating with residual test. The 
model of the regression equation is: 
1. The model for the First hypothesis (H1) 
Z = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + +b4X4+b5X5+e 
2. Model for Second hypothesis (H2) 
|e| = a + 𝒃𝟔Y 
Where : 
Y    = Financial Performance 
Z    = Capital Structure 
a     = Constants 
b1-b5    = Regression coefficient variable X1X5 
b6    = moderating variable regression coefficient 
X1     = Institutional Ownership 
X2     = Managerial Ownership 
X3    = Audit Committee 
X4     = Independence of the Board of Commissioners 
X5     = Independence of the Board of Directors 
| e |     = Error 
 
V. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
      Descriptive statistical analysis is used to perform the process of data selection, so that the data are 
analyzed has a normal distribution. 
Table. 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Y 80 -20,80 74,84 4,8508 10,26696 
X1 80 ,13 83,00 52,7136 22,31727 
X2 80 ,92 77,57 22,1306 20,01883 
X3 80 3,00 4,00 3,0500 ,21932 
X4 80 1,00 3,00 1,2750 ,50253 
X5 80 1,00 2,00 1,0250 ,15711 
Valid N (listwise) 80 
    
Source: Research Results, 2016 (data processed) 
Based on the results of descriptive statistics shown show that the data to be used in this study vary 
widely. This indicates that this research data may not be normally distributed. 
5.2 Classic Assumption Test 
Once the problem is found then transformed data by using data transformation technique through 
SQRT or square root so that it can solve the problem and meet the requirements of classic assumption 
test (Ghozali, 2016). The result of the transformation is as follows: 
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1. Normality Test 
Normality test can also be done by Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic test which is the most valid test 
above normality. This test is performed on the value generated from each variable with the result of 
significance value (Asymp Sig. (2-tailed)) is 0.172> 0.05 This states that the data is normally 
distributed. 
2.Multicolinearity test 
The multicollinearity test showed that the independent variables had a greater tolerance value than 0.1 
and VIF smaller than 10. It can be concluded that between the free varabel did not experience 
symptoms of multicollinearity. 
3. Autocorrelation Test 
The autocorrelation test using Durbin-Watson (D-W) test shows the value of 1.852 between the values 
1.7551 to 1.8996 so it can be concluded that there is no autocorrelation in this research variable. 
4. Heteroscedasticity Test 
It can be seen in the Scatterplot image that the points are spreading randomly and have been spread 
either above or below 0 (zero) on the Y axis so it can be concluded that there is no heteroscedasticity 
in the regression model. 
5.3. Hypothesis Testing First 
1. Coefficient Determination Test Results 
Table 2. Test Results of Coefficient of Determination 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,523
a
 0,273 0,199 1,10151 1,852 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SQRTX1, SQRTX2, SQRTX3, SQRTX4, SQRTX5 
b. Dependent Variable: SQRTY 
Source: Research Results, 2016 (data processed) 
Based on Table 2 the value of Coefficient (R) of 0.199 which shows the magnitude 
relationship between variables with the coefficient of determination (Adjusted R square) of 0.199 or 
19.9%. This means that the variables of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, audit 
committees, board independence and board independence can explain financial performance variables 
by 19.9% while the remaining 80.1% are explained by other variables beyond this estimation model. 
2. Significant simultaneous (Test Statistic - F) 
Table 3 . Statistical Test F 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 
26,89 6 4,482 3,694 ,003b 
Residual 
71,586 59 1,213     
Total 
98,477 65       
a. Dependent Variable: SQRTY 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SQRTX1, SQRTX2, SQRTX3, SQRTX4, SQRTX5 
Source: Research Results, 2016 (data processed) 
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Based on Table 3 it is known that the significant value of 0.003 is smaller than 0.05 and 
Fcount> Ftable (3.694> 2.33) then H1 is accepted so it can be said that corporate governance with 
indicators consisting of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, audit committee, board 
independence commissioners and the independence of the board of directors influence simultaneously 
on financial performance. 
3. Partial Significant Test (Test Statistic - t) 
Table 4 Statistical Test Results t 
 
Source: Research Results, 2016 (data processed) 
Based on the calculation as in table 4 then obtained the following equation: 
Y = 10,698 - 0,337SQRTKI - 0,413SQRTKM–2,601SQRTKA + 0,750SQRTIDK + 
0,339SQRTIDD 
The interpretation of the multiple linear regression equation above is as follows: 
a. Constants 
Constanta (α) is worth 10,698 meaning that if there is no influence of variable of institutional 
ownership, managerial ownership, audit committee, independence of board of commissioner and 
independence of board of directors equal to zero then financial performance will remain equal to 
10,698 at manufacturing company listed on BEI during 2012-2015. 
b. Institutional Ownership 
Variable institutional ownership value -0.337 means that each increase of institutional ownership of 
1%, then there will be a decline in financial performance of 0.337 or 33.7% assuming other variables 
are considered constant. The significance of institutional ownership variable is 0,009 or 0,9% <α = 
5%, and t-count <t-table (-2,687 <1,664) H1 is accepted where, institutional ownership is partially 
significant and negative to financial performance. 
c. Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership variable is -0,413all value of each managerial ownership increase of 1%, then 
there will be a decrease in financial performance of 0.413 or 41.3% assuming other variables are 
considered constant. The significance of managerial ownership variable is 0,001 or 0,1% <α = 5%, 
and t-count <t-table (-3,620 <1,664) H1 is accepted, where managerial ownership is partially 
significant and negative to financial performance. 
d. Audit Committee 
Coefficients
a 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 10,698 6,293 
 
1,700 ,094 
  
SQRTXI -,337 ,125 -,512 -2,687 ,009 ,340 2,943 
SQRTX2 -,413 ,114 -,615 -3,620 ,001 ,426 2,346 
SQRTX3 -2,601 2,955 -,119 -,880 ,382 ,676 1,479 
SQRTX4 ,750 ,838 ,115 ,894 ,375 ,747 1,339 
SQRTX5 ,339 2,754 ,014 ,123 ,902 ,947 1,056 
        
a. Dependent Variable: SQRTY 
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Audit committee is valued -2601, meaning that each variable increase audit committee of 1%, then 
there will be a decrease in financial performance of 2.601 or 26.01% assuming other variables are 
considered constant. The significance of the audit committee variables is 0.382 or 38.2%> α = 5%, 
and t-count <t-table (0.880 <1.664), H1 is not accepted, whereby partially audit committee has no 
significant and positive effect on financial performance. 
e. Independence of the Board of Commissioners 
The independence variable of the board of commissioners is 0.750, meaning that each increase in the 
independence of the board of commissioners is 1%, then there will be an increase in financial 
performance of 0.750 or 75% assuming other variables are considered constant. The significance of 
the independence variables of board of commissioners is 0.375 or 37.5%> α = 5%, and t-count <t-
table (0.894 <1.664) then H1 is not accepted whereby the independence of the board of 
commissioners is partially insignificant and positive to financial performance. 
f. Independence of the Board of Directors 
The independence variable of the board of directors is worth 0.339, it means that every increase of the 
directors' self-dependent variable is 1%, there will be an increase in the performance of 0.339 or 
33.9% with the assumption that other variables are considered constant. The significance of the 
independence variables of the board of directors is 0.902 or 90.2%> α = 5%, and t-count <t-table 
(0.123 <1.664) so H1 is not accepted whereby, the independence of the board of directors is partially 
insignificant and positive to financial performance. 
5.4 Second Hypothesis Testing 
Moderating Variable Regression 
Table 5 Residual Test Results 
Coefficients
a 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) ,422 ,068 
 
6,199 ,000 
  
SQRTY -,010 ,026 -,049 -,396 ,693 1,000 1,000 
a. Dependent Variable: AbsRes_1 
Source: Research Results, 2016 (data processed) 
Based on Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 can be seen the equation of residual test results: 
| e |   = -0,049-0,010Y 
       Table 5 illustrates a significant value of 0.693 greater than α = 0.05 with negative parameter 
coefficient value is -0.049. The results showed that the regression coefficient of financial performance 
is negative and not significant. It is clear that although the value of the negative parameter coefficient, 
the value is not significant or greater than 0.05, the capital structure can not moderate the relationship 
between GCG variables described by the variable of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, 
audit committee, the independence of the board of commissioners and the independence of the board 
of directors to the capital structure. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
6.1 Conclusions  
Based on the results of data analysis and discussion conducted in the previous chapter, then this 
research yields some conclusion as follows: 
1. Based on the simultaneous test results, the ownership of the institution, managerial ownership, 
audit committee, board of commissioner independence and board independence have a significant 
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influence on the value of the company in the manufacturing company listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during the period 2011-2015. Based on the partial test result, only institutional 
ownership and managerial ownership have a significant and negative influence on financial 
performance, while audit committee, board independence and board independence partially have 
no significant effect on financial performance. 
2. Based on the results of moderating testing shows that the regression coefficient of the dependent 
variable of financial performance is negative and not significant. The result of the moderation test 
obtained the result that the capital structure can not moderate the ownership of the institution, 
managerial ownership, audit committee, the independence of the board of commissioners and the 
independence of the board of directors to the financial performance. 
 
6.2 Limitations of Research  
This study has several limitations, namely: 
1. Capital structure as moderating variable in this research can not moderate the influence of 
independent variable to dependent variable. 
2. The ability of independent variables in explaining the dependent variable is only 19.9%. 
3. Selection of research objects only use manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during the period 2012-2015 as many as 20 companies. 
 
6.3 Suggestions 
Based on the results of research and conclusion as mentioned above, the following suggestions can be 
made: 
1. For the next researcher is suggested to use other research variables as moderating variable. 
Researchers can then use the variable growth of the company as a moderating variable. 
2. The number of independent variables should be added because this study is only able to explain 
19.9% to financial performance and 80.1% more described other independent variables that are not 
examined in this study. Researchers can then use other variables that can affect financial 
performance such as company size, current ratio and other variables. 
3. For further researchers who want to do further research that resembles this research is suggested to 
use the object of research at other companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange, so it can give 
better results to the problem under study. 
4. For the management of companies and investors, it is expected that this research can be used as 
material considerations and evaluation before the company sets new policies to improve financial 
performance as well the company's performance will be viewed favorably by potential investors. 
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